haku: @author Müller, W. / yhteensä: 14
viite: 3 / 14
| Tekijä: | Huck, S. Müller, W. Normann, H.-T. |
| Otsikko: | Stackelberg beats Cournot: on collusion and efficiency in experimental markets |
| Lehti: | Economic Journal
2001 : OCT, VOL. 111:474, p. 749-765 |
| Asiasana: | COMPETITION DUOPOLY EFFICIENCY |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. The authors implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, the authors replicate a pattern known from previous experiments. There is stable equilibrium play under random matching and partial collusion under fixed pairs. |
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