haku: @author Dunne, T. / yhteensä: 7
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| Tekijä: | Silva, D.G. de Dunne, T. Kosmopoulou, G. |
| Otsikko: | An empirical analysis of entrant and incumbent bidding in road construction auctions |
| Lehti: | Journal of Industrial Economics
2003 : SEP, VOL. 51:3, p. 295-316 |
| Asiasana: | Auctions Bidding Road construction industry |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions are explored in this paper. Entrants are found to bid more aggressively and to win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents. The differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant's costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent's and reltions of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs. |
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