haku: @author Olsen, T.E. / yhteensä: 3
viite: 2 / 3
| Tekijä: | Kaarboe, O.M. Olsen, T.E. |
| Otsikko: | Career concerns, monetary incentives and job design |
| Lehti: | Scandinavian Journal of Economics
2006 : VOL. 108:2, p. 299-316 |
| Asiasana: | careers job design monetary policy incentives welfare |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper studies optimal incentive contracts with limited commitments, and with agents having multiple tasks and career concerns (here as: c-crns). The agent's c-crns. are determined by the outside market. It is shown that the principal (as: p-pal.) might be willing to give the strongest explicit incentives to agents far from retirement to account for the fact that c-crns. might induce behaviour in conflict with the p-pal's preferences. In addition, it also is shown that maximized welfare might be decreasing in the strength of c-crns. |
SCIMA