haku: @author Gaudet, G. / yhteensä: 4
viite: 2 / 4
| Tekijä: | Benchekroun, H. Gaudet, G. Long, N. van |
| Otsikko: | Temporary natural resource cartels |
| Lehti: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2006 : NOV, VOL. 52:3, p. 663-674 |
| Asiasana: | cartels natural resources |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper investigates the behaviour of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced to break up into an oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, the authors show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life: that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which casee the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase: that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decresing beyond some level of the total initial stocks. |
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