haku: @author Osma, B.G. / yhteensä: 3
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Tekijä:Osma, B.G.
Otsikko:Board independence and real earnings management: the case of R&D expenditure
Lehti:Corporate governance
2008 : MAR, VOL. 16:2, p. 116-131
Asiasana:board of directors
agency theory
earnings
R&D
expenditure
companies
United Kingdom
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper explores the role of boards of directors in constraining research and development (R&D) spending manipulation. Based on a large sample of U.K. firms, it is studied whether independent boards are efficient at detecting and constraining myopic R&D cuts. The results indicate among others that more independent boards constrain the manipulation of R&D expenditure.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 266148
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