haku: @freeterm information asymmetry / yhteensä: 7
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| Tekijä: | Zhang, Y. |
| Otsikko: | Information asymmetry and the dismissal of newly appointed CEOs: An empirical investigation |
| Lehti: | Strategic Management Journal
2008 : AUG, VOL. 29:8, p. 859-872 |
| Asiasana: | board of directors chief executive officers managers manufacturing companies USA |
| Vapaa asiasana: | information asymmetry |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | It is questioned why some newly appointed Chief executive officers (CEOs) are dismissed while others are not. It is argued that the board of directors may make a poor selection at the time of CEO succession (here as: scn.), and as a result, have to dismiss the appointee after scn. when better information about him/her is obtained. Therefore, the level of information asymmetry at the time of scn. increases the likelihood of dismissal. Based on data on over 200 newly appointed CEOs, the results of this study support the argument. After controlling for alternative explanations of CEO dismissal, it is shown that the likelihood of dismissal of newly appointed CEOs is higher in outside scns. and/or if the scn. follows the dismissal of the preceding CEO etc. |
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