haku: @author Li, J. / yhteensä: 14
viite: 5 / 14
| Tekijä: | Chan, K.C. Li, J. |
| Otsikko: | Audit committee and firm value: Evidence on outside top executives as expert-independent directors |
| Lehti: | Corporate governance
2008 : JAN, VOL. 16:1, p. 16-31 |
| Asiasana: | audit committees financial performance agency theory |
| Vapaa asiasana: | independence full information maximum likelihood estimation |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The paper explains the relation between independence of audit committee and firm value with a sample of Fortune 200 companies. The full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation is used to examine firm value of these 200 firms. Firm specifics, board features, and director characteristics, are collected to control any contemporaneous events. To conclude the independence of audit committee results in higher firm value when a majority expert-independent directors serve on board. It was found as well that finance trained directors serving on an expert-independent audit committee improve firm value almost five times as much as that of the independence of audit committee alone. |
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