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| Tekijä: | Sibert, A. |
| Otsikko: | Is transparency about central bank plans desirable? |
| Lehti: | Journal of the European Economic Association
2009 : JUN, VOL. 7:4, p. 831-857 |
| Asiasana: | central banks inflation preferences planning |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | A central bank with private information about its preferences has an incentive to reduce its planned inflation. This would increase the public's perception of its inflation aversion and lower the expected future inflation. If planned inflation is observable and reveals the central bank's preferences, a regime is said to be transparent. If planned inflation is unobservable and can be only imperfectly inferred from actual inflation, the regime is said to be non-transparent. A central bank in the non-transparent regime is said to become more transparent when actual inflation becomes a better signal of planned inflation. This study demonstrates that in a non-transparent regime, increased transparency need not improve the public's ability to infer a central bank's private information. Society and central banks are better off with more transparency. |
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