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| Tekijä: | Chava, S. Purnanandam, A. |
| Otsikko: | CEOs versus CFOs: incentives and corporate policies |
| Lehti: | Journal of Financial Economics
2010 : AUG, VOL 97:2, p. 263-278 |
| Asiasana: | capital structure of companies cash management debt incentives |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This article examines how managerial risk-taking incentives affect a company's financial policies, and further demonstrate the influence of chief executive officers' (CEO) and chief financial officers' (CFO) incentives on corporate financial policies. It is shown that the more risk-decreasing the CEO incentives are, the lower leverage and higher cash balances the CEO pursues. In turn, the more risk-decreasing the CFO incentives are, the safer their debt-maturity choices are and the more earnings-smoothing through accounting accruals the CFO does. The stock option expensing regulation of 2004 is used to disclose the linkage between the incentives and corporate policies. |
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