haku: @indexterm product quality / yhteensä: 101
viite: 3 / 101
Tekijä:Levin, D.
Peck, J.
Ye, L.
Otsikko:Quality disclosure and competition
Lehti:Journal of Industrial Economics
2009 : MAR, VOL 57:1 p. 167-196
Asiasana:quality control
product quality
disclosure
competition
market structure
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:A costly quality disclosure is analyzed with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel, and the impact of competition on disclosure and welfare is characterized. It is shown that expected disclosure is higher in the case of a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare comparison depends on the costliness of disclosure: if the disclosure cost is low, welfare is higher under a cartel, but if the disclosure cost is high, welfare is higher under duopoly. Any case, disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus, but deficient in terms of consumer surplus.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 275158
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