haku: @indexterm economic policy / yhteensä: 1745
viite: 7 / 1745
| Tekijä: | Acemoglu, D. Golosov, M. Tsyvinski, A. |
| Otsikko: | Political economy of Ramsey taxation |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2011 : AUG, VOL 95:7-8 p. 467-475 |
| Asiasana: | taxation capital taxation fiscal policy economic policy political economy models |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model, assuming that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician unable to commit to policies. It is shown that, when the politician is as patient as the citizens, the Chamley–Judd outcome of zero long-run taxes holds. In contrast, if the politician's patience is worse than the citizens', the best (subgame perfect) equilibrium from the perspective of the citizens involves long-run capital taxation. |
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