haku: @indexterm environmental economics / yhteensä: 508
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| Tekijä: | Veld, K. van't Kotchen, M.J. |
| Otsikko: | Green clubs |
| Lehti: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2011 : NOV, VOL 62:3 p. 309-322 |
| Asiasana: | clubs public goods reputation environmental economics sponsorship |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper defines green clubs as programs in which firms voluntarily agree to meet environmental standards: clubs, as they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benefits to any participating firm; green, because they also make environmental public goods. The model illuminates a substantial tension between the congestion externality known from conventional club theory and the free-riding externality familiar from the private provision theory on public goods. Three common program sponsors are compared governments, industry, and environmental groups. It is found that if the monitoring of the club standard is perfect, a government constrained from regulating club size may find it better to leave sponsorship to industry if public-good benefits are quite low, or to environmentalists in the case of high public-good benefits. If monitoring is imperfect, a central question is whether consumers can infer a club being too large for its standard to be credible. If they can then the government may intentionally choose an imperfect monitoring mechanism to regulate club size indirectly. If they cannot then this reinforces the government's eagerness for delegating sponsorship. |
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