haku: @indexterm co-operation / yhteensä: 981
viite: 10 / 981
| Tekijä: | Francesconi, M. Muthoo, A. |
| Otsikko: | Control rights in complex partnerships |
| Lehti: | Journal of the European Economic Association
2011 : JUN, VOL. 9:3, p. 551-589 |
| Asiasana: | public goods co-operation investments financing economics technology |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | A theory of the allocation of authority is developed here, involving two players in a complex partnership, producing impure public goods. It is shown that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the produced goods and the degree of the goods' impurity. If the degree of impurity is large, main investor should be given the control rights, irrespective of preference considerations. There are some situations where this allocation is optimal even in the case of low degree of impurity as long as one party's investment is more important than the other one's. If the parties' investments are similarly important and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low-valuation party. If the importance of the parties' investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small, the low-valuation party should receive total authority. An extension in which side payments are infeasible is also analyzed. We check for robustness of the outcomes in several dimensions, such as allowing for multiple parties and for joint authority, and utilize our results to interpret a number of complex partnerships, for example in schools and child custody. |
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