haku: @journal_id 4606 / yhteensä: 318
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| Tekijä: | Grosse, S. Rockenbach, B. Putterman, L. |
| Otsikko: | Monitoring in teams: using laboratory experiments to study a theory of the firm |
| Lehti: | Journal of the European Economic Association
2011 : AUG, VOL. 9:4, p. 785-816 |
| Asiasana: | theory of the firm companies production employees co-operation |
| Vapaa asiasana: | teams |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Alchian and Demsetz's influential definition of the classical business firm (The American Economic Review, 1972, 62, 777-795) suggests that a concentrated residual claim is needed in the hands of a central agent, to motivate worker monitoring. We model monitoring as a way of revising team production from a collective action dilemma with strong free riding incentives to a productivity-enhancing chance with strong private marginal incentives to contribute effort. In an experiment, our subjects experience team production without monitoring, with a central monitor, and with peer monitoring. Then the subjects vote on employing the central monitor, who may keep a fixed share of the team output, or to rely on peer monitoring, entailing a coordination or free riding problem. The subjects generally prefer peer monitoring but switch to the specialist when unable to self-monitor successfully. Evidence is provided for situations where team members resist the appointment of a central monitor and also overcome coordination and free riding problems as well as for a situation where an Alchian-Demsetz-like firm grows in the laboratory. |
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