haku: @indexterm GAME THEORY / yhteensä: 415
viite: 9 / 415
| Tekijä: | Chou, P. Ben Passerini, K. |
| Otsikko: | Intellectual property rights and knowledge sharing across countries |
| Lehti: | Journal of Knowledge Management
2009 : VOL. 13:5, p. 331-344 |
| Asiasana: | game theory intellectual property law knowledge public policy international co-operation international relations |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The aim of this paper is to integrate the empirical and game theoretical points of view to address the strategic interactions between countries in choosing their optimal strictness of intellectual property rights (IPRs), and to identify how these countries can achieve an efficient and equitable equilibrium. Due to interrelation in countries' decisions on implementing IPR standards and protections, game theory is applied to characterize the scenarios before and after the 1994 Agreement on Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) involving developed and developing countries. The model indicates that the pre-TRIPS equilibrium consists of high-income (H-I) developed countries choosing a strong IPR protection while the middle-income (M-I) and low-income (L-I) developing countries implement a weak IPR standard. For countries to move from such an equilibrium to the similarly strong IPR regime under TRIPS, the H-I countries must compensate L-I and M-I countries that do not have sufficient conditions to attract knowledge/technology transfer. The compensation includes IPR protection implementation costs and increased royalties for patents. It appears to be difficult to reach an efficient and equitable equilibrium without the subsidies and side-payments from the developed countries to the developing countries. The results acknowledge that stronger IPR standards (as in TRIPS) are more likely to be implemented than an open source approach. |
SCIMA