haku: @indexterm negotiation / yhteensä: 621
viite: 5 / 621
Tekijä:Fleckinger, P.
Glachant, M.
Otsikko:Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate
Lehti:Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2011 : JUL, VOL. 62:1, p. 41-52
Asiasana:social services
industries
regulations
economic policy
game theory
human relations
negotiation
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:Does self-regulation increase social welfare? A policy game is developed featuring a regulator and a firm able to unilaterally commit to better environmental or social behavior to preempt upcoming public policy efforts. We demonstrate that the result depends on the variety of policy instruments available to the regulator. Self-regulation increases welfare if the regulator can only use mandatory regulation, but reduces welfare when he opts for a voluntary agreement. This indicates that self-regulation and voluntary agreements are not good complements when welfare is considered. Policy implications are derived and the basic model is extended to several dimensions.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 275764
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