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| Tekijä: | Dullieux, R. Ragot, L. Schubert, K. |
| Otsikko: | Carbon tax and OPEC's rents under a ceiling constraint |
| Lehti: | Scandinavian Journal of Economics
2011 : DEC, VOL. 113:4, p. 798-824 |
| Asiasana: | petroleum industry consumers equilibrium analysis wholesaling imports exporting game theory |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | We examine the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) of a game between oil-importing countries seeking to keep the atmospheric carbon concentration under a given ceiling, and oil-exporting countries. The importers set a carbon tax and the exporters control the producer price. Implicit feedback rules and explicit non-linear time paths of extraction, carbon tax, and producer price are obtained. Consumers are always able to reap a share of the scarcity and monopoly rents, while producers partially pre-empt the carbon tax only in the case of low marginal damage under the ceiling. The MPNE is set against to the efficient, open-loop, and cartel-without-tax equilibria. |
SCIMA