haku: @indexterm asymmetric information / yhteensä: 173
viite: 10 / 173
| Tekijä: | Krysiak, F.C. Oberauner, I.M. |
| Otsikko: | Environmental policy a la carte: letting firms choose their regulation |
| Lehti: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2010 : NOV, VOL. 60:3, p. 221-232 |
| Asiasana: | pricing econometrics asymmetric information air pollution environmental policy uncertainty |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Under uncertainty, the optimal choice between price and quantity instruments depends on the often private information of the regulated firms' technology. Here, an environmental policy delegating the prices-versus-quantities decision to the firms by letting them choose between an emissions tax and permit trading is studied. The policy is currently used in Switzerland. We provide a thorough characterization of the optimal policy and demonstrate this approach reducing expected social costs compared to a mere tax or permit-trading regime. An optimal allocation of firms to instruments is demonstrated to be able to achieve despite substantial informational constraints, and the introduction of the instrument choice is shown to benefit the firms compared to optimally designed single-instrument policies. Moreover, the conditions under which this approach likely is preferable to a hybrid regulation are discussed. |
SCIMA