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| Tekijä: | Llavador, H. Solano-Garcia, A. |
| Otsikko: | Immigration policy with partisan parties |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2011 : FEB, VOL. 95:1-2, p. 134-142 |
| Asiasana: | immigration public expenditure skilled workers unskilled workers equilibrium analysis political parties |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This article examines the political economy of immigration when the salient electoral issue is the amount of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditure in controlling immigration. We consider immigration affecting voters' welfare through economic and non-economic factors. Political competition à la Wittman is modeled with endogenously determined ideology of parties at equilibrium. Then, parties propose different immigration levels, located to the left and right of the median voter's ideal point, and merge skilled and unskilled workers among their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigration the two parties propose and the composition of parties' constituencies as the efficacy of immigration control and immigration aversion vary. |
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