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| Tekijä: | Ruiz-Mallorqui, M.V. Santana-Martin, D.J. |
| Otsikko: | Ultimate institutional owner and takeover defenses in the controlling versus minority shareholders context |
| Lehti: | Corporate governance
2009 : MAR, VOL. 17:2, p. 238-254 |
| Asiasana: | stocks institutional investors stock ownership voting consolidation banking Spain |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | We study the connection between the extent of voting rights held by the principal owner and the use of defense measures in Spanish listed firms in the case of an institutional investor as owner. If a bank or a fund is the principal shareholder, the defense level increases. However, while a larger bank's voting rights cause a negative impact on the probability and level of defense, the influence of a fund's voting rights is U-shaped. The results also imply that the coalition of two banks as the largest shareholders raises the defense. Our study is, to our knowledge, the first analysis of the connection between institutional control and defense in the controlling versus minority shareholders coillision. The findings highlight the key factor of the nature of the institutional owner in the ownership-protection relationship. Thus, while banks cause a substitution effect between voting rights and anti-takeover measures, in funds that effect occurs up to a certain voting rights' level, above which defense increases resulting from the possible reduction of exit barriers of their investment. European regulators should especially consider firms controlled by institutional investors, as ownership and anti-takeover measures are used by institutional owners to assure their power positions. Thus, in an environment of concentrated ownership, the institutional investors' presence deters the corporate control market as they either maintain high ownership levels or ease the adoption of defense measures. |
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