haku: @journal_id 475 / yhteensä: 1037
viite: 31 / 1037
Tekijä:Deutsch, Y.
Keil, T.
Laamanen, T.
Otsikko:A dual agency view of board compensation: the joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk
Lehti:Strategic Management Journal
2011 : VOL. 32:2, p. 212-227
Asiasana:agency theory
risk
risk behaviour
management
executives
executive remuneration
directors
compensation
stock options
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This article analyses the effects of compensation schemes awarded to outside directors and the CEO on firm-level risk taking. Data from S&P 1500 firms from 1997-2006 suggests that providing the CEO or outside directors with stock options increases risk taking, especially in the case of outside directors. Surprisingly, however, if both the outside directors and the CEO are provided with stock option compensation, the effect of outside directors reduces CEO's tendency to take risks.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 275260
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