haku: @freeterm enforcement / yhteensä: 6
viite: 3 / 6
| Tekijä: | Stranlund, J.K. Chavez, C.A. Villena, M.G. |
| Otsikko: | The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly |
| Lehti: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2009 : SEP, VOL. 58:2, p. 183-191 |
| Asiasana: | environmental economics pollution pricing costs asymmetric information uncertainty |
| Vapaa asiasana: | emissions taxes monitoring enforcement |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Herein, considered is the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes with their enforcement under incomplete information about firms' abatement costs, enforcement costs, and pollution damage. It is argued that optimality requires an enforcement strategy inducing full compliance by every firm, except possibly when a regulator can base the probabilities of detecting individual violations on observable correlates of violators' actual emissions etc. |
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