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| Tekijä: | Thomas, C.J. |
| Otsikko: | Information revelation and buyer profits in repeated procurement competition |
| Lehti: | Journal of Industrial Economics
2010 : MAR, VOL. 58:1, p. 79-105 |
| Asiasana: | industrial purchasing information competition prices buying profit |
| Vapaa asiasana: | procurement purchasing agents |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper examines how procurement costs are affected by the information revealed by buyers about sellers' behaviour, in a setting with two sequentially offered contracts. Expected prices are lowest when sellers learn nothing until all contracts are allocated, are higher when learning all sellers' price offers as contracts are allocated, and typically are even higher when learning only the winner's identity etc. The results suggest that buyers involved in repeated procurement may pay less by uncovering minimal or extensive information, rather than an intermediate amount. |
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