haku: @journal_id 475 / yhteensä: 1037
viite: 5 / 1037
Tekijä:Gore, A. K.
Matsunaga, S.
Yeung, P. E.
Otsikko:The role of technical expertise in firm governance structure: evidence from chief financial officer contractual incentives
Lehti:Strategic Management Journal
2011 : JUL, VOL. 32:7 p. 771-786
agency theory
executive remuneration
corporate governance
board of directors
chief executive officers
finance companies
Tiivistelmä:This article argues that the technical expertise in company governance structure reduces reliance on contractual incentives to control the potential agency problem for executives whose responsibilities require specialized knowledge. It is found that companies with financial expertise tend to use lower levels of incentive-based compensation for their chief financial officers. The results propose that financial experts provide stronger supervision and/or direction concerning company financial policies and strategies, thus allowing companies to reduce reliance on incentive compensation.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 276220
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