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| Tekijä: | Atallah, G. |
| Otsikko: | Research joint ventures with asymmetric spillovers and symmetric contributions |
| Lehti: | Economics of innovation and new technology
2007 : OCT-NOV, VOL. 16:7-8, p. 559-586 |
| Asiasana: | models R&D co-operation cartels competition investments research |
| Vapaa asiasana: | joint ventures information sharing spillovers |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In this paper, proposed is a new type of R&D cooperation (hereafter as: co-op.) btw. firms fitted out with asymmetric spillovers (here as: sp-ov/s.), called as symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures, also sharing information, but such that the asymmetric sp-ov/s. rates are increased through co-op. by equal amounts. Among others, it is found that this type of co-op. reduces R&D investment by the low sp-ov/s. firm when its sp-ov/s. is sufficiently low and the sp-ov/s. of its competitor is sufficiently high. Yet, it always increases the R&D of the high sp-ov/s. firm and total R&D, as well. The profitability of symmetric (here as: symm.) RJV cartelization (as: cart.) relative to other modes of co-op. is analyzed. Among others, it is found that symm. RJV cart. constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of sp-ov/s., that is, when asymmetries btw. sp-ov/s. are not too large. With the increase of these asymmetries, the equilibrium goes from symm. RJV cart., to RJV cart., to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization. |
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